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Hacking into Federal Court:
Employee "Authorization"
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act
ABSTRACT
Few would disagree that computers play an important role in
modern United States society. However, many would be surprised to
discover the modest amount of legislation governing computer use.
Congress began addressing computer crime in 1984 by enacting the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). The CFAA represented the
first piece of federal legislation governing computer crimes and has
undergone eight amendments to date, making it one of the most
expansive criminal laws in the United States. In 1994, Congress
added a civil provision opening the door for application of the statute
in novel situations. Initially enacted to target crimes committed by
"hackers," the most common type of CFAA case in recent years involves
claims brought against disloyal employees. The typical fact-pattern
involves an employee who uses his work computer to misappropriate
confidential or proprietary business information from his current
employer to start a new business venture or join a competitor.
Applying the CFAA to this common situation has resulted in a split of
authority regarding the interpretation of "authorization," an undefined
predicate for liability under the statute. Some courts have construed
the term narrowly, holding that an employee's misuse or
misappropriation of an employer's business information is not "without
authorization" so long as the employer has given the employee
permission to access such information. Others have construed the term
broadly, holding that an employer has a cause of action when an
employee obtains business information with disloyal intent for the
employee's own benefit or that of a competitor, regardless of whether
the employer granted permission to access the information.
This Note examines the CFAA's history and analyzes the
benefits of seeking relief under the CFAA compared to alternative
claims. It also discusses the judicial color given to the term
"authorization," looking at the rationales behind each approach and
focusing on emerging trends in the employer-employee context.
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Additionally, it examines past Supreme Court cases in an effort to
predict how the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve this issue. The
Note concludes by proposing that the Supreme Court adopt a narrow
interpretation of "authorization," and hold that an employee does not
violate the statute by acquiring interests adverse to those of his
employer when the employee accesses information with his employer's
permission.
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In the 1970s few people appreciated the potential of computers
to transform the way we do business, communicate, or even commit
crimes.' Computer use has increased since the mid-1980s, both in the
1. See Computer Use and Ownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
population/www/socdemo/computer.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) (only 8.2% of households had
personal computers in 1984).
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home and in the workplace. 2  For many employees, the use of
computers has been one of the most innovative workplace
transformations. 3  One can scarcely imagine a world without
computers-to contact friends and family, receive news, as well as
store and easily access data. Given the importance of these machines
and their prominence in the United States, the modest amount of
legislation relating to computer use is surprising.4
Computers confer substantial benefits to employers by
measurably increasing worker efficiency and allowing for greater
connectivity between enterprises and individuals.5 However, these
benefits often come at a price and pose new challenges for employers.6
While companies use passwords, firewalls, and encryption to protect
network data, they cannot safeguard confidential and proprietary
information in every instance.7 It is difficult, if not impossible, for
employers to prevent those employees with access to confidential
business information from disseminating that information to an
outside party.8 Typically, if the employee does not use the information
to start his or her own business, the outside party is a competitor.9
Employers have looked to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
to prevent insiders from misappropriating confidential information
and to recover losses resulting from a disloyal employee's
misappropriation. 10
In response to increasing computer use in the United States,
Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984-the first piece of federal
legislation addressing computer crime." Initially, the Act was
narrow, dealing only with criminal activity; however, Congress has
amended the Act eight times to accommodate the evolving role of
2. Id.
3. Adam M. Zaretsky, Have Computers Made Us More Productive? A Puzzle, THE
REGIONAL ECONOMIST (Oct. 1998), http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=1769.
4. See generally Computer Crime Legal Resources, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cclaws.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
5. Erik Brynjolfsson & Marshall Van Alstyne, Information Worker Productivity:
Evidence from Worker Output, Compensation and Email Traffic Data, CENTER FOR EBUSINESS
(Jan. 2005), available at http://ebusiness.mit.edu/researchlBriefs/VanAlstyneInfoProductivity
FinalVI.pdf; see also Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining
Employees'Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 820
(2009).
6. See infra Part I.
7. Field, supra note 5, at 820.
8. Sarah Boyer, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 6
RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 661, 661 (2009).
9. Field, supra note 5, at 820.
10. See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
11. H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 3691 (1984).
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computers in U.S. society. 12 Each amendment indicates a clear trend
toward expanding the Act's scope. 13 Congress added a civil provision
in 1994, allowing parties harmed by statutorily covered criminal
activity to recover compensatory damages or obtain injunctive relief.14
Employers have taken advantage of this provision to recover damages
from disloyal employees.15
While the CFAA is an expansive statute covering a wide range
of activity, this Note addresses CFAA claims against employees or
former employees for misusing or stealing proprietary or confidential
information accessed using an employer's computer.16  Whereas
employees once had to remove physical materials to smuggle
confidential information from an employer, the proliferation of
computers and the increased ease of information transfer have
facilitated misappropriation. 17  "With increasing numbers of
employees using computers at work, employers have turned to the
CFAA in situations where disloyal employees have pilfered company
information from the employer's computer system." 8
The most common form of employee misconduct involves the
misappropriation of "[c]lient lists, marketing secrets, price indexes,
and other company specific information in order to start a new
company [or] to compete unfairly with a former employer."19 A brief
hypothetical illustrates this common scenario.
An employer, Spotless House Company ("Spotless"), is in the
home-cleaning business. It has invested considerable time, effort, and
money to develop its client list and business methods to serve clients
efficiently. Employees Andy and Brian are cleaning coordinators,
responsible for maintaining client lists, cleaning schedules, and
market pricing. Andy and Brian have been with Spotless for several
years and have access to Spotless's business records. They have
12. Boyer, supra note 8, at 665.
13. See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1561 (2010) (discussing five substantial modifications of the statute from its
inception in 1984 through the 2008 amendment as part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and
Restitution Act of 2008).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2008).
15. See, e.g., Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Ariz. 2008)
(addressing the question of whether a claim is properly brought under the CFAA when an
employee emailed himself the employer's proprietary business information shortly before leaving
to work for a competitor).
16. See, e.g., NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (S.D. Iowa 2009)
(discussing claims brought by employer against a former employee for accessing the employer's
computer in order to obtain business information for his own personal benefit and to the
detriment of his employer).
17. Boyer, supra note 8, at 661.
18. Field, supra note 5, at 819.
19. Boyer, supra note 8, at 662.
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determined they could make more money by starting a competing
cleaning business, rather than working for Spotless. Before resigning,
Andy emails Spotless's client list, employee names, price schedules,
and market intelligence reports to his personal email account. Andy
and Brian then resign and shortly thereafter open Crystal Clear
Cleaning ("Crystal"), which will directly compete with Spotless.
Spotless experiences many client losses to Crystal, as well as
decreased revenues, and decreased growth in client development.
Spotless learns that Andy stole its proprietary business information in
order to start Crystal. In addition to various state law claims,
Spotless brings a CFAA claim against Andy to recover losses incurred
as a result of his "unauthorized access" to its computer system. 20
By examining court decisions interpreting "authorization," an
undefined predicate for liability under the CFAA, this Note analyzes
whether an employer like Spotless has a CFAA claim against an
employee like Andy for accessing its computers "without
authorization."21 Part I examines the Act and its history, including
statutory amendments. Additionally, it addresses the benefits of
seeking relief under the CFAA rather than other available remedies.
Part II presents a detailed discussion of the judicial color given to
"authorization." Specifically, it analyzes the rationales behind each
approach, focusing on emerging trends in the employer-employee
context. It also examines past Supreme Court decisions for clues as to
how the Court will ultimately resolve this issue. Part III proposes
that the Court adopt a narrow interpretation of "authorization," and
exclude from liability an employee who acquires interests adverse to
those of his employer when the employee accesses information with
his employer's permission.
I. CFAA AND THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYEE "AUTHORIZATION"
A. Importance of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Recognizing that computer use would become an important
part of everyday life,22 Congress enacted the CFAA at a time when the
personal computer was still in its infancy and computer use was
20. See Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 962, for another common situation resulting in
employer action under the CFAA.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 3694 ("Over the past quarter of a century our society
has witnessed an amazing technological transformation. The computer has become an integral
part of our everyday lives, critical to our national defense, financial transactions, and
information transmissions.").
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limited primarily to educational institutions and the government. 23
Personal computers did not become commonplace in the United States
until the 1990s. 2 4 In 1984, the year Congress enacted the CFAA, only
8.2 percent of U.S. households had personal computers. 25  That
number continued to grow steadily, and by 2003, 61.8 percent of
households had a computer and 54.7 percent had Internet access. 26
Congress enacted the CFAA to aid the government in
prosecuting computer crimes, 27 targeting hackers "who accessed
computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer
functionality."28 The Act was the first piece of federal legislation
addressing computer crimes. 29 Today, it remains primarily a criminal
statute, prohibiting unauthorized access to computers,30 and is one of
the most expansive criminal laws in the United States.31
The numerous amendments since 1984 indicate a clear trend
toward expanding the Act's scope.32 First, in 1986, Congress added
three new provisions, the most significant of which subjects a person
to criminal liability if the individual accesses a computer without
authorization and causes $1,000 or more in damage. 33 In 1994,
Congress added civil liability to the CFAA, allowing victims to sue for
compensatory damages or injunctive relief.34 Congress added this civil
remedy to "[o]ffset the monetary damage caused by criminal
violations." 35 A second 1994 amendment expanded the statute to
apply to computer damage resulting from negligence. 36
23. See infra Part I.
24. Computer Use and Ownership, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 3694 ("[W]hile our society has been readily afforded access
to computer technology so as to improve the standard of living of law-abiding citizens, so too
have criminal elements gained access to computers in order to perpetuate crimes.").
28. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009).
29. Kerr, supra note 13; H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 3691.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
31. Kerr, supra note 13.
32. See id. (discussing five substantial modifications of the statute from its inception in
1984 through the 2008 amendment as part of the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution
Act of 2008).
33. Id. at 1565. There were other means to fall within the statute, but for the purpose of
this Note, the most significant is accessing a computer without authorization and causing the
statutory amount of damages. It is this provision that expanded the CFAA's scope into the
employer-employee domain, and led to the ambiguity in interpreting "without authorization"
pertaining to an employee's actions. Id.
34. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
35. Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating
Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. 1MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155, 160 (2008).
36. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1566.
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In 1996, Congress further expanded the Act by removing
restrictions on the type of information covered by the Act and adding a
new category of "protected computers."37 Any computer used in
interstate commerce-for example, any computer connected to the
Internet-is considered a "protected computer."38 Recently, Congress
further revised the CFAA in 2008,39 removing the requirement of an
interstate communication from § 1030.40 Significantly, the statute
now extends liability to "[a]ny unauthorized access to any protected
computer that retrieves any information of any kind, interstate or
intrastate,"41 protecting "[a]ll networked business computers and the
information stored on them."4 2
Section 1030(g) allows for a civil remedy in certain
circumstances:
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section may
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and
injunctive relief or other equitable relief. A civil action for a violation of this section may
be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (1), (11),
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i). 4 3
The aggravating factors set forth in § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) include:
modification or impairment of medical treatment for an individual;
physical injury; a threat to public health or safety; damage to a
computer owned by the U.S. government; or causing loss to one or
more persons in a one year period aggregating to at least $5,000.44
In the employer-employee scenario this Note addresses, a
plaintiff bringing a civil claim under the CFAA must show that the
defendant's access to a "protected computer" was either "without
authorization" or "exceeded authorized access."45 The CFAA defines
both "exceeds authorized access" and "protected computer," but not
"authorization."46 Because "authorization" is undefined, courts have
37. Id. at 1567.
38. The 1996 amendments replaced the category of "federal interest" computers with
"protected computers." Id.
39. There was also an amendment in 2001 as part of the Patriot Act; however, those
changes are not relevant in the situation posed in this Note. See Kerr, supra note 13, at 1568.
40. Id. at 1569.
41. Id.
42. Liccardi, supra note 35, at 160.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2008).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i) (factors I-V).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). Employer claims against employees are typically brought under
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) or (a)(4). See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132
(9th Cir. 2009); ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609 (M.D. Tenn.
2010).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (The term "exceeds authorized access" is defined as "access
to a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter." The term "protected computer"
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inconsistently applied the statute in cases where an employer has
sued an employee for improperly using confidential or proprietary
business information. 47
B. The Benefits of Asserting a CFAA Claim
Employers derive significant benefits from the availability of a
civil action against disloyal employees under the CFAA.48 First, the
cause of action offers litigants a doorway into federal court that would
otherwise be unavailable.49 Without the CFAA, in the hypothetical
situation introduced above, Spotless could sue Andy only in state court
for breach of contract,50 breach of fiduciary duty, or trade secret
misappropriation. 51 In contrast, under some courts' interpretation of
"authorization," employers are able to pursue claims under the CFAA
in federal court and file one or more state claims through federal court
supplemental jurisdiction. 52
Second, plaintiffs face a lower burden of proof when they bring
claims under the CFAA rather than a claim for trade secret
misappropriation under state law. 5 3 To make out a state trade secret
claim, plaintiffs typically must show that (1) the information qualifies
as a trade secret; (2) the plaintiff took reasonable measures to prevent
the information's disclosure; and (3) the defendant acquired the trade
secret through wrongful means.54 In contrast, under the CFAA,
plaintiffs need not prove that the misappropriated information or
computer data was a trade secret under state law.5 5 Rather, they need
means a computer "(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States
Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a financial
institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that
use by or for the financial institution or the Government, or (B) which is used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the
United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or
communication of the United States").
47. Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (W.D. Tenn. 2008).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
49. Liccardi, supra note 35, at 187.
50. This assumes that the employer has had employees sign documents prohibiting the
alleged conduct that gave rise to the case.
51. See Boyer, supra note 8, at 662.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990).
53. Liccardi, supra note 35, at 187.
54. See id. at 158-60, for a more thorough discussion on what is required to make out a
trade secret misappropriation claim.
55. Id. at 157.
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only show that the information was accessed from a "protected
computer."56
II. ANALYZING THE COURT SPLIT
In recent years, suits against disloyal employees-primarily
civil-have become the most common type of action brought under the
CFAA and have sharply divided lower courts.57 While courts should
apply the provisions of the CFAA uniformly, they have inconsistently
interpreted the terms "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized
access."58 Diverse results from courts facing fact patterns similar to
the hypothetical posed above demonstrate the need to adopt a uniform
approach in applying CFAA provisions. 59 The various interpretations
of "authorization" can generally be characterized as reflecting either a
"broad view" or a "narrow view" of the term. 60
The narrow view of authorization reasons that an employee
who is authorized to access an employer's computer retains
authorization even if the employee misappropriates or misuses the
employer's confidential data thereafter. 61 Proponents of the broad
view argue that when an employee misuses or steals company data, he
acts contrary to his employer's interests and therefore loses his
authorization even though his initial access was authorized. 62 Most
circuit courts facing CFAA claims arising out of employee misconduct
have broadly construed "authorization."63 Only the Ninth Circuit has
adopted the narrow view, in LVRC Holdings v. Brekka.64
While this Note focuses primarily on the narrow and broad
views, courts interpreting "authorization" have also adopted various
other definitions of the term. 65 The "agency-based" interpretation is
essentially the same as the "broad view."66  The "code-based"
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008). Under the CFAA, it is irrelevant what information was
accessed so long as it was accessed from a "protected computer" and "without authorization" or
"exceeding authorized access." Id.
57. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1583.
58. Compare LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), with Int'l
Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
59. Compare Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127, with Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418.
60. Lewis-Burke Assocs. LLC v. Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192-194 (D.D.C. 2010).
61. Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009).
62. Id.
63. Compare Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127 (construing "authorization" narrowly), with
United States. v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010), and Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418 and EF
Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (construing "authorization"
broadly).
64. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127.
65. Field, supra note 5, at 819-30.
66. Id. at 823-25.
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interpretation is grounded in the operation of computers and implies
that access becomes unauthorized when a person "bypasses code-
based protections designed to limit use of the computer system."67 It
limits liability to scenarios in which users intentionally manipulate a
computer to gain greater access. 68 The "contract-based" interpretation
requires a breach of contract to find an employee's computer use to be
unauthorized. 69  Though not widely recognized, these additional
interpretations of "authorization" may influence the Supreme Court if
it confronts this issue. This Note will focus primarily on the more
widely-used narrow and broad views.
A. The "Narrow View"-Authorized Access Cannot Be Terminated
Courts adopting the narrow interpretation hold that an
employee, once granted permission to access an employer's computers,
does not run afoul of the CFAA regardless of how he subsequently
uses the information. 70 An employee's misuse or misappropriation of
an employer's proprietary business information is not "without
authorization" if the employee has been given permission to access
such information.71 In the hypothetical posed above, Andy would not
be liable for accessing Spotless's computer "without authorization"
even though he acquired interests adverse to his employer and used
Spotless's proprietary business information for his own benefit.
Although numerous district court cases have construed
"authorization" narrowly, every circuit court addressing a situation
similar to the above hypothetical embraced the broad view until
Brekka in 2009.72 The Brekka court-like others interpreting
"authorization" narrowly-articulated several rationales for doing so:
(1) the plain meaning of the statute compels a court to interpret
"authorization" narrowly;73 (2) the rule of lenity and canon of avoiding
absurd results favor a narrow construction;74 (3) the legislative history
67. Id. at 825.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 827.
70. Shamrock Foods v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964-65 (D. Ariz. 2008).
71. Id.
72. See United States. v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Phillips,
477 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2007); United States. v. Salum, 257 Fed. Appx. 225 (11th Cir. 2007); Int'l
Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the
Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504 (3rd Cir. 2005) (dicta); EF Cultural Travel BV
v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1991).
73. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at
*5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
74. Id. at *7.
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and congressional intent support such a finding;75 and, (4) efficient
judicial administration requires that courts interpret the statute
narrowly.76
1. Plain Meaning
Many courts narrowly construing "authorization" in the CFAA
note that the plain language of the Act supports such a reading
because the term is undefined and the statute is silent as to misuse.77
It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that when a
statutory term is undefined it must be given its ordinary meaning.78
"Authorization" is commonly understood as "the act of conferring
authority; permission."79 Proponents of the narrow view argue that
the statute only addresses unauthorized procurement or alteration of
information, and "without authorization" or "exceeds authorized
access" "cannot be read to encompass an individual's misuse or
misappropriation of information to which the individual was
permitted access." 80 Courts draw a clear distinction between initial
authorization to access information and an individual's subsequent
use of that information.81 The statute does not mention "misuse,"82
and the common understanding of "authorization" obviates the need to
seek outside sources, including Agency law principles, to interpret the
term.83
Further, other parts of the statute, specifically the definitions
of "damage" and "loss," are consistent with the plain meaning
interpretation and a prohibition on computer hacking.84 Extending
liability whenever individuals misuse computer information to which
they have been granted access would be a departure from the plain
meaning of the statutory text and would extend liability beyond the
75. ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
76. Boyer, supra note 8, at 661-63.
77. See, e.g., LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009).
78. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the word
"authorization" for purposes of the CFAA is "of common usage, without any technical or
ambiguous meaning"); United States v. Aleynikov, No. 10 Cr. 96(DLC), 2010 WL 3489383, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010).
79. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at
*5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006) (quoting The American Heritage Dictionary 89 (1976)) (brackets
omitted).
80. Aleynikov, 2010 WL 3489383, at *15.
81. Id.
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
83. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965 (D. Ariz. 2008).
84. Major, Lindsey & Africa, LLC v. Mahn, No. 10 Civ. 4239(CM), 2010 WL 3959609, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2010).
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bounds Congress intended.85 In summary, an employee is authorized
to access a company computer "[w]hen the employer gives the
employee permission to use it."86
2. The Rule of Lenity and Canon of Avoiding Absurd Results
A second argument advanced by courts narrowly construing
"authorization" relies on the rule of lenity and the canon of avoiding
absurd results.87 The rule of lenity states that courts should resolve
any ambiguity in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant, because
defendants should be on notice as to which acts are criminal.88 Courts
apply the rule to the CFAA because the Act is primarily a criminal
statute.89 Narrow view advocates point out that, because nothing in
the statute suggests that employee liability turns on a breach of
loyalty, it would be improper to hold an employee criminally liable for
such a breach:90
If the employer has not rescinded the defendant's right to use the computer, the
defendant would have no reason to know that making personal use of the company
computer in breach of a ... fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a criminal
violation of the CFAA. It would be improper to interpret a criminal statute in such an
unexpected manner.
9 1
The rule of lenity also applies in the civil context because when
a statute "has 'both criminal and noncriminal application,' courts must
'interpret the statute consistently.' 92 The rule of lenity is inherently a
back-up to the plain meaning argument: 93 "Authorization" should be
given its plain meaning, but in the event that a court finds the term
ambiguous, it should resolve that uncertainty in favor of the
defendant and construe the statute narrowly.94 To hold otherwise
85. Aleynikov, 2010 WL 3489383, at *15.
86. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009).
87. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
88. Bell Aerospace Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1272
(M.D. Ala. 2010).
89. The civil provision was an add-on to that statute in 1994-"an afterthought."
Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965-66 (D. Ariz. 2008).
90. Lewis-Burke Assocs. v. Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135).
91. Id. (quoting LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009)).
92. Bell Aerospace Serus., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d at 1272 (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543
U.S. 1 (2004)).
93. The reason is that if the statute is not ambiguous and is accorded its plain meaning
then courts never look to the rule of lenity. The rule of lenity is only invoked when courts face an
ambiguous statute.
94. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966-67.
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would "sweep broadly within the criminal statute breaches of contract
involving a computer."95
Courts have also looked at the potentially absurd results that
would result from construing "authorization" broadly and imputing
agency law principles to the CFAA. 96 In Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Speed, the court noted that by reading agency principles into the
statute, "employers suddenly have a federal cause of action whenever
employees access the company computer with 'adverse interests' and
such access causes a statutorily recognized injury."97  Employees
routinely use "protected computers" throughout their workday for a
vast array of functions, including many unrelated to an employer's
business.98 As one commentator stated, "employee use of computers
tracks employee attention spans."99 In addition to carrying out duties
in their official capacities, employees invariably check personal email,
weather, or news throughout the workday-activities that, if done
without permission and inadvertently causing damage, may give rise
to CFAA liability under the broad interpretation of "authorization."100
3. Legislative History and Congressional Intent
A third argument espoused by "narrow view" proponents is
that the history and intent behind the statute both favor a narrow
construction. 101 Courts note that Congress originally enacted the
statute to create a cause of action against computer hackers, 102
according to a 1984 House Report, which emphasized that the CFAA
"deals with an 'unauthorized access' concept of computer fraud rather
95. Id. at 967.
96. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1585.
100. Speed, 2006 WL 2683058, at *7.
101. See ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (M.D. Tenn.
2010) ("Congress did not intend the CFAA to extend to situations where the access was
technically authorized but the particular use of the information was not."); Jet One Group, Inc. v.
Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., No. 08-CV-3980 (JS)(ETB), 2009 WL 2524864, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug.
14, 2009) ("[T]he statute, read as a whole, strongly indicates that Congress' intent was to
prohibit the act of accessing a computer without authorization - not misusing data that one had
a lawful right to access."); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and
"Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1617 (2003) (arguing that
the legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended the CFAA to do for
computers what trespass and burglary laws did for real property); see also Field, supra note 5, at
829-41 (2009) (thoroughly discussing the CFAA's legislative history devoid of any factual
coloring to determine what, if any, value and insight can be derived from the statute's legislative
history).
102. Shamrock Foods v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965-66 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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than the mere use of a computer." 103 As recognized by the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, "Congress was
endeavoring to outlaw computer hacking and electronic trespassing,
not providing a new means of addressing the unfaithful employee
situation."104 Furthermore, Congress aimed the 1986 amendment at
narrowing the sweep of the statute by removing one of the "murkier
grounds of liability," the result of which was a person's access might
have been be legitimate in one instance, but criminal in another
nearly identical instance.105 The amendment eliminated any reference
to a defendant's purpose for accessing information, and instead
focused on access-core language that remains unchanged.106 Courts
embracing the narrow view also cite Senate reports highlighting the
difference between "access without authorization" and "exceeding
authorized access." 10 7 The reports suggest that Congress was more
concerned with "outsiders," such as hackers or others "without
authorization" than "insiders" such as employees, who "exceed
authorized access."108  Congress intended to eliminate electronic
trespassing, not to police or monitor an insider's subsequent use of a
computer after access is granted.109 Unsurprisingly, courts favoring
the "broad view" also use legislative history to support their
interpretation, suggesting that the history is ambiguous, and
therefore a less compelling justification of either view.110
4. Judicial Administration
Finally, narrow-view proponents argue that a broad
construction of the statute places an undue administrative burden on
103. H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 3706 (1984); see also Briggs v. State, 704 A.2d 904, 911
(Md. 1998) (quoting Committee Report System, Summary of Committee Report, House Bill 121
(1984)) ('The purpose of the bill is to deter individuals from breaking into computer systems.").
104. Major, Lindsey & Africa, LLC v. Mahn, No. 10 Civ. 4239(CM), 2010 WL 3959609, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 7, 2010).
105. See Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966 ("By enacting this amendment, and providing an
express definition for 'exceeds authorized access,' the intent was to 'eliminate coverage for
authorized access that aims at 'purposes to which such authorization does not extend,' thereby
'removing from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier grounds of liability, under which a
person's access to computerized data might be legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in
other (not clearly distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to exceed his
authorization.") (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390
F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 n. 12 (D. Md. 2005)) (internal brackets omitted).
106. US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (D. Kan. 2009).
107. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Field, supra note 5, at 829-30 ("[M]any of the courts struggling to interpret
authorization have turned to the CFAA's legislative history, often finding support for whichever
interpretation they themselves adopt in the end.").
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federal courts, because it forces them to resolve disputes brought by
employers against employees, suits traditionally within the province
of state courts, which implicate state, more so than federal,
interests."' In addition to the anchor claim, federal courts will also
hear the derivative claims "so related" to the CFAA claim that they
arise out of the same case or controversy.112 The increased caseload is
both inefficient and expensive for the federal judicial system. 113
5. Criticisms of the "narrow view"
There are very few criticisms of the narrow view noted in court
opinions. 114  However, one court has found the rule of lenity
unavailing because no statutory ambiguity exists. 115 Another criticism
of the narrow view is that it does not provide the necessary flexibility
to combat computer crime as it continues to evolve. 116 Taking a black-
and-white view of "authorization" would deprive courts of the
flexibility to find liability in the infrequent circumstances that may
warrant it.117
Moreover, the narrow view would preclude many actions
arising from disloyal employees being brought in federal court. While
narrow view proponents view this as a benefit in reducing the federal
case load, it may also eliminate the benefit of a uniform body of law in
this area. Also, in criticizing the absurd results argument, broad view
proponents would argue that the absurd results achieved from
construing "authorization" broadly does not consider an employee's
intent.
B. The "Broad View"-Employee Misuse Vitiates Authorization
All but one circuit court confronting situations similar to the
hypothetical posed in this Note have construed "authorization"
broadly. 118 The broad interpretation advances the theory that an
employer has a cause of action under the CFAA when an employee
with disloyal intent obtains business information for his own benefit
111. See Boyer, supra note 8, at 662 ("[Tjhe issues of 'unauthorized use' or 'damage or
loss' . . . should be construed narrowly" in order to keep the claims out of federal court. Otherwise
the courts will be overrun with claims by employers against former employees.").
112. Id.
113. Id. at 663.
114. See, e.g., NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
115. United States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 2009).
116. See infra Part II.
117. Id.
118. See supra Part II.
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or that of a competitor." 9 Under this view, an employee may be
initially "authorized" but loses that authorization once the employee
acts with adverse interests to his or her employer "against the duty of
loyalty imposed on an employee in an agency relationship."1 2 0 The
primary difference between the narrow and broad interpretation is
that under the broad interpretation, an employee can lack
authorization in two ways: Either the employee "(1) was never granted
permission to use the computer" (comports with the narrow view); or
"(2) has been granted access as the access-grantor's agent but loses
authorization to access the computer when the agent breaches his
duty of loyalty."121 Implicit in this view is the integration and merger
of agency law principles into the CFAA.122
The broad view focuses on "an employee's initial access of the
employer's computer with the intent to either obtain information or
defraud the employer." 123 In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,
the First Circuit became the first federal appellate court to squarely
address the meaning of "authorization" in the context of a civil CFAA
claim brought by an employer.124 The Explorica court and other
circuit courts, as well as numerous district courts, 125 provide several
rationales for construing "authorization" broadly, including: (1) the
agency relationship, between an employee and his employer, and the
duty of loyalty implicit in it;126 (2) the presence of employer
agreements with its employees; 127 and (3) legislative history and
congressional intent.128 Interestingly, courts that interpret the statute
119. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964 (D. Ariz. 2008).
120. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *5.
121. NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1057 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
122. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *5.
123. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1059.
124. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). The next Circuit court case decided which dealt with
the disloyal employee fact set was Int'l Airport Ctrs. LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
Several other cases predated both Citrin and Explorica, but they are distinguishable. See United
States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.
1991).
125. See, e.g., Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass.
2009); Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1042; Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage,
Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
126. Ervin & Smith Adver. & Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Ervin, No. 8:08CV459, 2009 WL
249998, at *8 (D. Neb. Feb. 3, 2009) ("[W]hile the Defendants ordinarily may have been
authorized to access the information they appropriated from Plaintiff, that authorization was
terminated when Defendants destroyed the agency relationship by accessing and appropriating
the protected information for their own personal gain and against the interest of their
employer.").
127. Explorica, 274 F.3d at 581-82; Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc., No. 6:05-CV-
456, 2007 WL 275476, at *13 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
128. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 45-6; Pac. Aero. & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d
1188, 1195 (E.D. Wash. 2003).
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broadly are more inclined to rely upon case precedent for doing so. 129
In the hypothetical introduced above, Andy violated the CFAA under
the broad view because he breached his duty of loyalty to his employer
by accessing Spotless's computers to send client lists and other
confidential data and therefore, his access was "unauthorized."130
1. Agency Law Principles
An argument commonly raised in favor of the broad
interpretation of "authorization," based on agency law principles,
asserts that a breach of the duty of loyalty owed by employees to
employers terminates the agency relationship and renders previously
authorized access to computer files unauthorized. 1 3 1 One of the more
influential and oft-cited cases employing this argument is Int'1 Airport
Centers, LLC v. Citrin.132  In Citrin, an employer sued a former
employee who had deleted all data from his laptop, including the
results of his work and evidence of previous improper conduct, before
returning the computer to his employer. 133 The court found:
[h]is authorization to access the laptop terminated when, having already engaged in
misconduct and decided to quit. . . in violation of his employment contract, he resolved
to destroy files that incriminated himself and other files that were also the property of
his employer, in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes on an
employee. 13 4
Relying on the black-letter agency principle that "[u]nless otherwise
agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of
the principal, he acquires adverse interests or is otherwise guilty of a
serious breach of loyalty to the principal," 135 courts have found that an
employee's authorization terminates the moment he acquires interests
adverse to his employer. 136 This theory requires judicial inquiry into
the employee's state of mind at the time of data access. 137
129. See, e.g., PharMerica, Inc. v. Arledge, No. 8:07-cv-486-T-26MAP, 2007 WL 865510
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2007). This may be because many of the early decisions construed
"authorization" broadly and it was easy for courts to cite to and follow established case
precedent.
130. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
131. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
132. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
133. Id. at 419.
134. Id. at 420.
135. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958).
136. Shurgard Storage, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1125.
137. Id.
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2. Employer Policies and Agreements
While not an argument for broad construction in general,
courts have construed the CFAA more liberally where a policy of the
employer, or agreement with the employee, explicitly proscribes
prohibited conduct. 138 However, while the presence of an employment
agreement may bolster the employer's case against a rogue employee,
it is not dispositive. 139 In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the
First Circuit held that employer agreements may define the limits of
"authorization."140 The former employees in that case used their
knowledge of proprietary codes in breach of their confidentiality
agreement with their former employer to create a program that
significantly increased the efficiency with which they could collect
information from their former employer's website. 141 Even though the
website was public, the ex-employees' use of confidential information
in accessing it more efficiently made the access "unauthorized." 14 2
Other courts, while not specifically relying on employer agreements to
find employee access "unauthorized," have found the presence of
employer agreements noteworthy in defining "authorized access." 143
3. Legislative History and Congressional Intent
In addition to agency principles and employment agreements,
broad-view proponents also cite legislative history indicating that
Congress intended the CFAA to have an expansive reach. 144
Advocates of the broad-view rely on the consistent Congressional
expansion of the CFAA's scope and coverage since its enactment, in
particular, the amendment in 1994 providing for a civil remedy. 145
Courts point to these expansions as proof of Congress's intent to






143. See Ervin & Smith Adver. & Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Ervin, No. 8:08CV459, 2009 WL
249998, at *8 (D. Neb. Feb. 3, 2009) ("The Confidential Agreement in the Ervin & Smith
Employee Handbook supports Plaintiffs contention that Defendants were only authorized to
access this protected information so long as they abided by the agreed-upon terms found within
the Handbook. . . . Consequently, the Court concludes that Defendants never had authorization
to access Plaintiffs protected information to further their own business interests. Instead, when
Defendants allegedly violated the Confidential Agreement and allegedly appropriated Plaintiffs
secret information for their own private benefit, they exceeded their authorized access.").
144. Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009).




extend the Act beyond hacking, and bring a wide array of computer
crimes within its reach, including actions such as Andy's toward
Spotless. 146 Several specific amendments illustrate this intent. In
addition to the civil remedy for the "unauthorized removal of
information from a company's computer database" added in 1994,147
Congress also widened the CFAA's sweep to encompass more
computers by replacing "federal interest computer" with "protected
computer." 148 Those favoring a broad construction of the statute argue
that a narrow reading ignores Congress's statutory amendments
consistently broadening the application of the CFAA, which they view
as a signal that Congress intended to cast a wide net over crimes
perpetrated with computers. 149
4. Criticisms of the "Broad View"
Those who believe "authorization" should be construed
narrowly have criticized the reasoning that courts adopting the broad
view employ.150 Criticisms of the broad view include: (1) the statutory
amendments to the CFAA, while broadening its scope, did not deal
with "authorization;" 15 1 (2) the absence of any statutory language
pertaining to employee misuse of company information; 152 and (3) the
void for vagueness doctrine, which supports a narrow view of
"authorization." 153
The first two counterpoints are straightforward and require
little explanation. As noted, Congress has amended the CFAA
numerous times, and each amendment has expanded the scope of the
statute. 154 However, the amendments primarily relate to penalties
associated with a CFAA violation and did not alter the "without
146. NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009).
147. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1196.
148. See Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 1058-59 (quoting S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996))
("[Tihe proposed § 1030(a)(2)(C) is intended to protect against the interstate or foreign theft of
information by computer . . .. This [section] would ensure that the theft of intangible information
by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical items are
protected... . The crux of the offense under § 1030(a)(2)(C), however, is the abuse of a computer
to obtain the information. . . . For example, individuals who intentionally break into, or abuse
their authority to use, a computer and thereby obtain information of minimal value of $5,000 or
less, would be subject to a misdemeanor penalty. The crime becomes a felony if the offense was
committed for the purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain . . .
149. Id. at 1058.
150. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 13, at 1585.
151. ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613 (M.D. Tenn. 2010).
152. United States v. Aleynikov, No. 10 Cr. 96(DLC), 2010 WL 3489383, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 3, 2010).
153. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1585.
154. Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't Inc. v. Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009).
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authorization" requirement to invoke liability. Congress has given no
indication as to how courts should construe "authorization."155
Furthermore, courts that have read the statute broadly "identify no
statutory language that supports interpreting the CFAA to reach
misuse or misappropriation of information that is lawfully accessed.
Instead, they improperly infer that 'authorization' is automatically
terminated where an individual 'exceeds the purposes for which access
is authorized."'1 56 Indeed, the statutory text does not mention "misuse
of information." 15 The CFAA establishes unauthorized access as a
predicate for any violation, making it unreasonable that an employee,
working on his own computer, could incur CFAA liability. 15 8 For
liability to result from an employee's improper activities on his own
computer, broad-view courts must determine his subjective intent
when viewing the information.159 This is typically established by
analyzing how the employee used the information.160  It seems
unlikely, however, that Congress intended such a subjective analysis
under the CFAA.161 It contorts the statute to say that an employee
does not have authorized access to his work computer because of his
subjective intent in doing so. 16 2 An employee is either "authorized," or
not, and it would be quite odd to think that an employee could lose his
authorization simply by changing his thoughts.
Scholars have more recently argued that the void for vagueness
doctrine also requires courts to reject the broader agency view of
authorization. 163 The doctrine instructs that if a statute provides
insufficient clarity for the average citizen to understand what it
prohibits and to whom it applies, the vagueness renders it void and
unenforceable. 16 4 The broader agency view of authorization leaves
many questions unanswered and does not provide sufficient guidance
to citizens as to what conduct is prohibited; therefore, the argument
goes, courts should reject it as unconstitutionally vague. 165 As one
commenter asked:
155. ReMedPar, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
156. Aleynikov, 2010 WL 3489383, at *17.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
158. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
159. Id. at *6.
160. Id.
161. Aleynikov, 2010 WL 3489383, at *17.
162. Id.
163. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1585.
164. Id. at 1573.
165. Id. at 1585.
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Is use of an employer's computer for personal reasons always prohibited? Sometimes
prohibited? If sometimes, when? And if some amount of personal use is permitted,
where is the line? If use of an employer's computer directly contrary to the employer's
interest is required, how contrary is directly contrary? Is mere waste of the employee's
time enough? 166
These are some of the many questions that arise from, and remain
unanswered by, the broad view of "authorization" based in agency
law. 167
The void for vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due Process
Clause and has two independent tests: (1) does the law provide fair
notice as to what it prohibits?; and (2) does the law allow for
discriminatory enforcement? 168 The fair notice test asks whether the
law is "so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain"
as to the prohibited conduct, leaving judges and jurors to decide cases
without fixed standards. 69  The discriminatory enforcement
component finds that a statute is "unconstitutionally vague if it does
not 'establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement,"' and
therefore encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.170
Because the broad view fails to define what employee conduct is
prohibited, and because it allows prosecutors, judges, and juries undue
discretion to punish some "offenders" but not others, it violates the
void for vagueness doctrine. 171  Therefore, courts must either
invalidate the CFAA or adopt the narrow interpretation both to
provide the fair warning necessary to defendants and to limit
government discretion.172
C. Trends in Court Opinions Addressing the Employee-Employer
Context
When surveying the opinions confronting employer claims
against former disloyal employees, some trends emerge that may shed
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1586; see also United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding
that conviction under the CFAA based only on defendant's intentional violation of internet
website's terms of service would violate the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
168. Kerr, supra note 13 at 1573.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1574 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).
171. Id. at 1586. The void for vagueness doctrine refers to a "statute defining a crime
which is so vague that a reasonable person of at least average intelligence could not determine
what elements constitute the crime. Such a vague statute is unconstitutional on the basis that a
defendant could not defend against a charge of a crime which he/she could not understand, and
thus would be denied 'due process' mandated by the 5th Amendment." Void for Vagueness,
LAW.COM LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2228 (last visited
Feb. 08, 2010).
172. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1575.
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light on how the Supreme Court might ultimately to resolve this
issue. 73 As noted above, all but one circuit hearing employer claims
arising from a situation similar to the hypothetical posed in this Note
have construed the CFAA broadly, finding that "authorization"
terminated when the employee acquired adverse interests to the
employer. 174 While the broad view faction is dominant in circuit court
opinions, a more even split emerges when rulings on this issue by
federal district courts are also considered.175 Looking at these
173. See infra Part II.
174. Compare United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int'l Airport Ctrs. v.
Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); Explorica, 274 F.3d at 577 (construing the CFAA broadly
finding employee liability), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127 (construing the CFAA narrowly
finding that subsequent misuse is irrelevant so long as initial access was authorized). See also
P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504 (3rd Cir.
2005) (although not the holding of the case, the opinion seems to favor a broad construction of
"authorization").
175. Compare John, 597 F.3d at 263; Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418; P.C. Yonkers, Inc., 428 F.3d
at 504; Explorica, 274 F.3d at 577; Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine LLC, No. 09 Civ.
8122(LLM), 2010 WL 2034404 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't Inc. v.
Pullen, 665 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2009); NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042
(S.D. Iowa 2009); Dental Health Prods., Inc. v. Ringo, No. 08-C-1039, 2009 WL 1076883 (E.D.
Wis. Apr. 20, 2009); Motorola, Inc. v. Lemko Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 760 (N.D. Ill. 2009); United
States v. Nosal, No. CR 08-00237, 2009 WL 981336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009); Ervin & Smith
Adver. & Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Ervin, No. 8:08CV459, 2009 WL 249998 (D. Neb Feb. 3, 2009);
TEKsystems, Inc. v. Modis, Inc., No. 08 C 5476, 2008 WL 5155720 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 5, 2008);
Alliance Int'l, Inc. v. Todd, No. 5:08-CV-214-BR, 2008 WL 285 9095 (E.D.N.C. Jul. 22, 2008);
Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc. v. Capstone Orthopedic, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (E.D.
Cal. 2008); Res. Ctr. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Ability Res., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (D. Kan.
2008); Calyon v. Mizuho Sec. USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2241(RO), 2007 WL 2618658 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
5, 2007); Dudick ex rel Susquehana Precision, Inc. v. Vaccarro, No. 3:06-CV-2175, 2007 WL
1847435 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 25, 2007); Pharmerica, Inc. v. Arledge, No. 8:07-cv-486-T-26MAP, 2007
WL 865510 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2007); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc., No. 6:05-CV-456,
2007 WL 275476 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2007); Forge Indus. Staffing, Inc. v. De La Fuente, No. 06 C
3848, 2006 WL 2982139 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2006); ViChip Corp. v. Lee, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (N.D.
Cal. 2006); Int'l Sec. Mgt. Group, Inc. v. Sawyer, No. 3:06CV0456, 2006 WL 1638537 (M.D. Tenn.
Jun. 6, 2006); Nilfisk-Advance, Inc. v. Mitchell, No. Civ. 05-5179, 2006 WL 827073 (W.D. Ark.
Mar. 28, 2006); Hub Grp., Inc. v. Clancy, No. Civ.A. 05-2046, 2006 WL 208684 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25,
2006); George S. May Int'l Co. v. Hostetler, No. 04 C 1606, 2004 WL 1197395 (N.D. Ill. May 28,
2004); Pacific Aerospace & Elec., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (E.D. Wash. 2003);
Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash.
2000) (construing "authorization" broadly), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1127; Oce North Am., Inc. v.
MCS Serv., Inc., No. WMN-10-CV-984, 2010 WL 3703277 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2010); Major, Lindsey
& Africa, LLC v. Mahn, No. 10 Civ. 4239(CM), 2010 WL 3959609 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010); United
States v. Aleynikov, No. 10 Cr. 96(DLC), 2010 WL 3489383 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2010); Lewis-
Burke Assocs., LLC v. Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 187, 192-94 (D.D.C. 2010); Univ. Sports Pub. Co.
v. Playmakers Media Co., No. 09 Civ. 8206(RJH), 2010 WL 2802322 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2010);
Nat'1 City Bank, N.A. v. Republic Mortg. Home Loans, LLC, No. C09-1550RSL, 2010 WL 959925
(W.D. Wash. Mar. 12, 2010); Orbit One Commc'n, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Consulting Prof'l Res., Inc. v. Concise Tech. LLC, No. 09-1201, 2010 WL
1337723 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010); Bell Aerospace Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F.
Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2010); Clarity Servs., Inc. v. Barney, No. 8:08-cv-2278-T-23TBM, 2010
WL 1140865 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2010); ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d
605, 609 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Mortg. Now, Inc. v. Stone, No. 3:09cv8O/MCRIMD, 2009 WL 4262877
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decisions over time, it appears that, while courts favored the broad
view early on, the narrow view has recently gained critical mass.16
First, this Note examines decisions involving a situation like
the Spotless hypothetical.'7 7 Looking at the decisions of both circuit
and district courts by year, the number of courts construing
"authorization" in the CFAA narrowly versus those construing it
broadly breaks down as follows: From 2000 to 2006, eleven opinions
adopted the broad view while three adopted the narrow. 78 In 2007,
four courts interpreted "authorization" broadly and three narrowly.179
In 2008, there were four broad decisions and three narrow. 80 In 2009
the trend started to shift, with six broad decisions and eleven
narrow.18' As of late 2010, two courts had chosen the broad view and
eleven the narrow.182 These numbers show that courts have shifted
from favoring the broad view to an overwhelming preference for the
narrow.183 It is difficult to determine exactly why this switch has
occurred, but one influential factor may be Brekka,184 which gave
district courts a persuasive precedent, as well as arguments to cite,
(N.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2009); Joe N. Pratt Ins. v. Doane, No. V-07-07, 2009 WL 3157337 (S.D. Tex.
Sep. 25, 2009); Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 378 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Jet One
Grp., Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc.,No. 08-CV-3980 (JS)(ETB), 2009 WL 2524864 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 14, 2009); Vurv Tech. LLC v. Kenexa Corp., No. 1:08-cv-3442-WSD, 2009 WL 2171042 (N.D.
Ga. Jul. 20, 2009); Salestraq Am., LLC v. Zyskowski, 635 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (D. Nev. 2009); Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollander, No. C08-1039, 2009 WL 535990 (N.D.Iowa Mar. 3, 2009);
Bridal Expo, Inc. v. Van Florestein, No. 4:08-cv-03777, 2009 WL 255862 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009);
Lasco Foods, Inc. v. Hall & Shaw Sales, Mktg., & Consulting LLC, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D.
Mo. 2009); US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Kan. 2009); Condux Int'l, Inc.
v. Haugum, No. 08-4824 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 5244818 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2008); Black & Decker,
Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D.Tenn. 2008); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp.
2d 962 (D. Ariz. 2008); Diamond Power Int., Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D.Ga.
2007); B & B Microscopes v. Armogida, 532 F. Supp. 2d 744 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Brett Senior &
Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2007); Lockheed
Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006);
Int'l Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md.
2005); Secureinfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Va. 2005) (construing
"authorization" narrowly).
176. Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 194.
177. Some judgment was exercised in sorting through the cases to determine which are
close enough to the hypothetical between Spotless and Andy presented in this Note. Included in
the cases under consideration for this section are 5 Circuit Court opinions and 53 District Court
opinions. See supra note 175.





183. See supra Part II.
184. See NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009) ("[N]o
Courts of Appeals decisions have adopted the narrow view of the CFAA.").
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when construing the statute narrowly.186 Prior to Brekka, most courts
interpreted authorization broadly, but they provided little explanation
for doing so, and summarily cited binding or persuasive precedent.
Conversely, courts that did rule narrowly provided more robust
explanations for their decisions.186
Since several Circuit Courts of Appeal have already ruled on
the authorization issue, so that courts in those jurisdictions cannot
make an independent decision, the more interesting analysis turns on
the district court cases in circuits without binding precedent-the
Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits. Lower courts within the Second Circuit favor the narrow
approach with five narrow decisions and two broad decisions from
2007 to 2010.187 Significantly, in 2010, only one of five decisions in the
Second Circuit interpreted "authorization" broadly.188 The law in the
Third Circuit is interesting because while one appellate opinion hints
in dicta that the CFAA should be construed broadly, subsequent
district court opinions have declined to adopt the dicta. 189 The circuit
is fairly evenly split with three broad and four narrow decisions from
2005 to 2010; however, similar to the overall trend, district courts in
the Third Circuit have clearly favored the narrow view recently.190
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have also shown a preference for the
narrow view by three to one in the Fourth Circuit and two to one in
185. Indeed, reading through 7th Circuit opinions subsequent to Citrin, the courts
seemingly feel handcuffed as a result of binding precedent construing the statute broadly. See,
e.g., Dental Health Prods., Inc. v. Ringo, 2009 WL 1076883, at *6-7 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 20, 2009).
186. Compare, e.g., Hub Grp., Inc. v. Clancy, No. Civ.A. 05-2046, 2006 WL 208684 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 25, 2006), with Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL
2683058 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
187. Compare Mktg. Tech. Solutions, Inc. v. Medizine LLC, No. 09 Civ. 8122(LLM), 2010
WL 2034404 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2010), and Calyon v. Mizuho Sec. USA, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
2241(RO), 2007 WL 2618658 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2007) (construing "authorization" broadly), with
Major, Lindsey & Africa, LLC v. Mahn, No. 10 Civ. 4239(CM), 2010 WL 3959609 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
7, 2010); United States v. Aleynikov, No. 10 Cr. 96(DLC), 2010 WL 3489383 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
2010); Univ. Sports Pub. Co. v. Playmakers Media Co., No. 09 Civ. 8206(RJH), 2010 WL 2802322
(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 14, 2010); Orbit One Commc'n, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 692 F. Supp. 2d 373
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jet One Grp., Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., No. 08-CV-3980 (JS)(ETB),
2009 WL 2524864 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2009) (construing "authorization" narrowly).
188. Id.
189. P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d
504 (3rd Cir. 2005).
190. Id.; Consulting Profl Res., Inc. v. Concise Tech. LLC, No. 09-1201, 2010 WL
1337723 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010); Bro-Tech Corp. v. Thermax, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 378 (E.D. Pa.
2009); Brett Senior & Assocs., P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377 (E.D. Pa. July
13, 2007); Dudick ex rel Susquehana Precision, Inc. v. Vaccarro, No. 3:06-CV-2175, 2007 WL
1847435 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 25, 2007); B & B Microscopes v. Armogida, 532 F. Supp. 2d 744 (W.D. Pa.
2007); Hub Grp., Inc. v. Clancy, No. Civ.A. 05-2046, 2006 WL 208684 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2006).
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the Sixth Circuit. 191 A district court in the D.C. Circuit also joined the
narrow camp with its recent opinion, Lewis-Burke Assocs., LLC v.
Widder.192 The Eighth and Tenth Circuits are evenly split on the
issue.193 The Eleventh Circuit has not been nearly as conflicted on
this issue and is dominated by courts construing "authorization"
narrowly, by a ratio of six to one.194 Overall, the district courts in
circuits yet to confront this issue have shown a fairly strong
preference for the narrow interpretation of "authorization," citing
many of the same rationales discussed above. 195
D. The Crystal Ball-Supreme Court Clues
Given Congress's reluctance to further delimit the CFAA, a
uniform definition of "authorization" will need to come from the
Supreme Court.196 Several Supreme Court decisions may shed light
on how the Court could frame and resolve the interpretation of
"authorization."197
As the Court has long recognized, "laws so vague that a person
of common understanding cannot know what is forbidden are
191. Compare Oce North Am., Inc. v. MCS Serv., Inc., No. WMN-10-CV-984, 2010 WL
3703277 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2010); ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 609
(M.D. Tenn. 2010); Black & Decker, Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D.Tenn. 2008); Int'l
Assoc. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md.
2005); Secureinfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Va. 2005), with Alliance Intl,
Inc. v. Todd, No. 5:08-CV-214-BR, 2008 WL 285 9095 (E.D.N.C. Jul. 22, 2008); Int'l Sec. Mgt.
Group, Inc. v. Sawyer, No. 3:06CV0456, 2006 WL 1638537 (M.D. Tenn. Jun. 6, 2006).
192. Lewis-Burke Assocs. v. Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.D.C. 2010).
193. NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Am. Family
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hollander, No. C08-1039, 2009 WL 535990 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 3, 2009); Ervin &
Smith Adver. & Pub. Relations, Inc. v. Ervin, No. 8:08CV459, 2009 WL 249998 (D. Neb. Feb. 3,
2009); US Bioservices Corp. v. Lugo, 595 F. Supp. 2d 1189 (D. Kan. 2009); Lasco Foods, Inc. v.
Hall & Shaw Sales, Mktg., & Consulting LLC, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Condux
Int'l, Inc. v. Haugum, No. 08-4824 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 5244818 (D. Minn. Dec. 15, 2008); Res.
Ctr for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Ability Res., Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1204 (D. Kan. 2008); Nilfisk-
Advance, Inc. v. Mitchell, No. Civ. 05-5179, 2006 WL 827073 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 28, 2006).
194. Bell Aerospace Servs., Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs., Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (M.D. Ala.
2010); Clarity Servs., Inc. v. Barney, No. 8:08-cv-2278-T-23TBM, 2010 WL 1140865 (M.D. Fla.
Feb. 26, 2010); Mortg. Now, Inc. v. Stone, No. 3:09cv80/MCRIMD, 2009 WL 4262877 (N.D. Fla.
Nov. 24, 2009); Vurv Tech. LLC v. Kenexa Corp., No. 1:08-cv-3442-WSD, 2009 WL 2171042 (N.D.
Ga. Jul. 20, 2009); Diamond Power Int., Inc. v. Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (N.D.Ga. 2007);
Pharmerica, Inc. v. Arledge, No. 8:07-cv-486-T-26MAP, 2007 WL 865510 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21,
2007); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 1, 2006).
195. See supra Part II.
196. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1563.
197. See supra Part II.
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unconstitutional on their face." 198  At least arguably, because
authorization lacks a fixed meaning, the ambiguity renders CFAA
vague-a person of common understanding cannot be sure what is
forbidden.199 By way of example, a Supreme Court case discussing the
void for vagueness doctrine is Coates v. City of Cincinnati.200 The case
dealt with an Ohio statute making it unlawful for persons to gather on
sidewalks or street corners and engage in conduct annoying to persons
passing by. 2 0 1 The Court found the statute vague because the word
"annoy" is unclear and cannot readily be given a fixed meaning. 202
Essentially, the Court held that "no standard of conduct [was]
specified at all," leaving men of common intelligence to guess as to its
meaning.203 Similarly, the word "authorization" in the CFAA is
arguably vague and cannot readily be given a fixed meaning. 204 This
suggests that the Supreme Court may construe the term narrowly.
Another Supreme Court case relevant to the issue is Carpenter
v. United States, which approved the conversion of an ordinary duty of
loyalty violation into a federal offense. 205  Relying upon agency
principles, the court affirmed mail- and wire-fraud convictions of a
Wall Street Journal ("Journal") reporter who provided insider
information to his cohorts, who then used the information to engage in
profitable stock transactions. 2 0 6 The Court noted that "[e]ven in the
absence of a written contract, an employee has a fiduciary obligation
to protect confidential information obtained during the course of his
198. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971) (Black, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); U.S. v. L. Cohen Grocery
Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921)).
199. See supra Part II.
200. Coates, 402 U.S. at 614-16. This argument goes that the CFAA, if not construed
narrowly, is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide adequate notice to possible
defendants as to what conduct is criminal and does not provide the necessary law enforcement
standards.
201. Id. at 611.
202. Id. at 614 ("We are thus relegated, at best, to the words of the ordinance itself. If
three or more people meet on a sidewalk or street corner, they must conduct themselves so as not
to annoy any police officer or other person who should happen to pass by. In our opinion this
ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to
an unascertainable standard . . .. Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus,
the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an
imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of
conduct is specified at all.").
203. Id.
204. See supra Part II.
205. Nick Akerman, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Count Dismissed Against Goldman
Sachs Computer Programmer Charged with Stealing Source Code, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://computerfraud.us/recent-updates/computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-count-
dismissed-against-goldman-sachs-computer-programmer-charged-withstealing-source-code.
206. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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employment."2 0 7 Intentionally exploiting that information for personal
benefit amounted to a scheme intended to defraud the Journal. 208 The
Court showed little hesitation imputing this agency notion into mail-
and wire-fraud statutes.209 The Court reasoned that the confidential
business information was the Journal's "property," which made it
easier to find specific intent and fraud on behalf of the reporter and
his cohorts. 210 Given the Supreme Court's readiness to impute agency
principles into mail- and wire-fraud statutes to safeguard an
employer's confidential business information, there is "no sound
reason why it cannot also proscribe the scope of an employee's
authorization to access his employer's computer in the context of the
CFAA."211
The Supreme Court's handling of RICO cases is also
instructive.212 Specifically, the Court stated in Boyle v. United States
that reinterpreting statutes does not render them void: "that RICO
has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."213
Following that logic, one can argue that "like the RICO Act, the broad
text of the CFAA 'does not demonstrate ambiguity, it demonstrates
breadth."'214 However, the RICO statute at issue in Boyle can be
distinguished from the CFAA, because the Boyle Court found the
RICO statute unambiguous, while the language of CFAA is less
clear. 215
A couple of general trends toward judicial restraint in Supreme
Court jurisprudence may also shed light on how the Court is likely to
construe the CFAA. The Court has consistently held that statutes
should not be construed aggressively in novel ways because doing so
207. Id. at 27.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 28.
211. Akerman, supra note 205.
212. Maxwell S. Kennerly, Civil Remedies, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and
Stolen Trade Secrets, LITIGATION & TRIAL (July 7, 2009), http://www.litigationandtrial.coml
2009/07/articles/litigation/news/civil-remedies-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-and-stolen-
trade-secrets.
213. Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2247 (2009).
214. Kennerly, supra note 212.
215. See Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at 2246-47 ("Because the statutory language is clear, there is
no need to reach petitioner's remaining arguments based on statutory purpose, legislative
history, or the rule of lenity. In prior cases, we have rejected similar arguments in favor of the
clear but expansive text of the statute. . . . We have repeatedly refused to adopt narrowing
constructions of RICO in order to make it conform to a preconceived notion of what Congress
intended to proscribe.").
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would upset the reasonable expectations of citizens, 216 and that
statutes are to be interpreted according to their "plain and
unambiguous meaning. "217
III. NARROW MINDED
Given the frequent congressional modifications to the CFAA 2 1 8
and the long-standing judicial disagreement over the proper
interpretation of "authorization" as applied to employer claims against
rogue employees, 219 it is curious that Congress has not taken the
opportunity to further clarify the term. Indeed, it appears unlikely
that Congress will act before the Supreme Court has an opportunity to
provide a fixed meaning to "authorization."220 Because it created a
circuit split, the Brekka decision substantially increased the likelihood
that the Supreme Court will hear a case involving the interpretation
of "authorization," and it likely shortened the wait. 221  After
considering the arguments above, this Note proposes that the
Supreme Court adopt the narrow construction of "authorization"
without tests or conditions.
A. Resolving the Split-Keeping it Simple
The Supreme Court should interpret "authorization" narrowly,
finding that an employee who has permission to access an employer's
computer is authorized to use that computer. It should be irrelevant
what the employee does on the computer, because the statute
emphasizes access to the computer, not its use.2 2 2 This interpretation
is not only supported by the plain meaning of the statute, the CFAA's
legislative history, and the rule of lenity, but also allows for a
consistent and predictable application of the statute.223 If an employee
uses her work computer to email a confidential client list to her
personal email account, has she accessed the employer's computer
without authorization? Clearly not-the employee has done
something wrong, but the wrong was not improperly accessing the
216. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing United
States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (2008) (plurality opinion)).
217. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340-41 (1997).
218. See supra Part II.
219. Id.
220. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1563.
221. Brekka created a split among circuit courts as to the meaning of "authorization."
Due to the presence of this split, the Supreme Court is now more likely to resolve the meaning of
"authorization" in the CFAA. See supra Part II.
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
223. See supra Part II.
570 [Vol. 13:3:543
EMPLOYEE AUTHORIZATION
computer. Theft provides another simple example. If a person is
invited into someone's home and steals jewelry while inside, the
person has committed a crime-but not burglary-because he has not
broken into the home. The fact that the person committed a crime
while inside the home does not change the fact that he was given
permission to enter.
Not only does a narrow construction of "authorization" make
intuitive sense, but it also sets clear boundaries for the application of
the CFAA. Litigants continue to use the CFAA in novel ways, and in
settings a person would not expect the Act to apply.2 2 4 Lawyers will
find any and all claims to bring against defendants and seek creative
means to achieve this end, such as suing clients' former employees for
misappropriating confidential information. 225 The question remains,
what are the boundaries of the CFAA? By construing "authorization"
broadly, it is not only uncertain as to how the statute will apply, but
also where and when it will apply.
A recent example of the uncertainty engendered by the broad
view is United States v. Drew, a case brought against a "cyberbully"
under the CFAA. 2 2 6 Lori Drew set up a MySpace account pretending
to be a sixteen-year-old boy named Josh Evans for the purpose of
befriending her thirteen-year-old neighbor, Megan Meier.22 7 Drew
then abruptly ended the friendship, telling the girl that "the world
would be a better place without her in it."228 Later the same day, the
young girl committed suicide.229 Understandably, many people were
upset and federal prosecutors sought to bring claims against Drew for
setting up the MySpace account and tormenting her young
neighbor.230 However, the only claim actually brought was under the
CFAA, on the theory that "the creation of the 'Josh Evans' profile had
violated the [Terms of Service (TOS)] of MySpace.com, and that the
TOS violation rendered the access to MySpace's computers"
unauthorized. 2 3 1  This example is a dangerous expansion of the
224. See infra note 226.
225. See supra Part II.
226. Scott Michels, Alleged MySpace Hoaxer on Trial Today, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=6281225 ("The case is believed to be one of the first of its
kind to use the statute barring unauthorized access to computers, which has previously been
used to combat computer hacking, to address so-called cyberbullying. Drew's lawyers and outside
legal experts have argued that the unusual prosecution, if successful, could broaden the scope of
what's considered criminal conduct on the internet.").
227. Id.
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CFAA-even if Drew had read the CFAA, it would be unclear that the
Act encompassed her conduct. 232
The Drew case is an excellent example of wrongful conduct that
does not fit neatly into any crime currently on the books. As a result,
prosecutors search to find something close, "even if it's a stretch."233
However, the judiciary should not "stretch" statutes to reach conduct
that Congress did not criminalize. 234 The Drew case also illustrates
the problems associated with allowing terms of service (or employment
agreements) to govern the bounds of "authorization."235 By allowing
these agreements to define what is-and is not-authorized, a simple
contract violation would become a federal crime.236  It is highly
unlikely that Congress meant to confer this type of power to private
actors.
Under the broad view of "authorization," an employee's access
could also vacillate between authorized and unauthorized depending
on the circumstances. 2 37  As the court described in Lewis-Burke
Associates, LLC v. Widder:
[Under the broad view, an] employee might have different authorization to access the
same document on the same computer throughout his or her employ. For example, an
employee might generate a report during the course of his employment, to which he
would have authorized access. If, as time progressed, the employee began looking for
employment elsewhere, and he accessed the report to refresh his memory as to what he
did on the report so that he could better describe his skills and abilities on his r~sumb or
in an interview, under [the broad view] he would have accessed the report without
authorization. Then, if the employee was internally promoted, decided not to seek
outside employment, and accessed the report to provide an example to one of his new
subordinates of how he liked reports written, his interests would again be aligned with
the employer, and his access would be authorized. In the extreme example, the same
employee's authorization to access a document could concurrently be both with
authorization and exceeding authorization. For example, the employee could have
authority to access a report to e-mail it out for a superior to review, but his
authorization might be exceeded if he then also decided to blind copy his personal e-mail
account, so that he would have a copy of the report to use as a writing sample for a
future job search. Congress could not have intended a person's criminal and civil
232. See Michels, supra note 226 ("'It seems this is advancing arguments that are a
dangerous expansion of the law .... When you think of computer hacking, you think of picking
virtual locks. But when we're talking about violating the terms of service [of MySpace], we're no
longer talking about breaking a lock, just about breaking a rule that you probably didn't know
existed."').
233. Mary Fulginiti & Bonnie McLean, Prosecutors Get Creative in MySpace Hoax Case,
ABC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=4515995.
234. Separation of power principles reserve lawmaking for Congress, and by "stretching"
existing statutes the judiciary is in essence legislating.
235. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1581.
236. Id.
237. Lewis-Burke Assocs. v. Widder, 725 F. Supp. 2d 187, 193 (D.D.C. 2010).
572
EMPLO YEE AUTHORIZATION
liability to be so fluid, turning on whether a person's interests were adverse to the
interests of an entity authorizing the person's access.
2 38
Part of the problem is that technology is outpacing the law, and
the legislature needs to catch up. 2 3 9 Courts should not attempt to
remedy the situation by contorting existing statutes to fit the
situation. Before courts should scrutinize an employee's use of
employer computers under the CFAA, Congress needs to authorize
such scrutiny by amending the statute to reach misuse.
B. Employer Recommendations
Unless and until the Supreme Court construes the CFAA
narrowly, employers should take precautions to ensure the means to
pursue a cause of action against disloyal employees. The CFAA
currently serves as a fail-safe in situations where no law covers the
wrongful conduct at issue; however, this Note proposes the
elimination of that backstop, at least until Congress has authorized it.
In the meantime, employers are operating in an environment where
interpretation of the CFAA is inconsistent and uncertain. 240
Employers should implement policies that will not only strengthen
CFAA claims, but also ensure that other claims can be brought
against a disloyal employee.
Employers should allow access to key company data only to
those employees who need the information, access to which should be
monitored.241 Employers should also define what an employee is
permitted to access within its computer system-and put it in writing.
By password protecting sensitive files and not allowing employees to
access them unnecessarily, employers can more easily establish a
CFAA claim. For example, if an employee requires the password of
another to access information and then emails it to himself, this
situation presents a stronger CFAA claim than if the employee had
general access to the employer's computer system. 2 4 2 Taking these
simple additional steps will not only enhance the chances of a
successful CFAA claim in the current legal environment, but will also
ensure that an employer has alternative means of redress.
238. Id. at 193-94.
239. Fulginiti & McLean, supra note 233.
240. See supra Part II.
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Additionally, employers should have written employment and
confidentiality agreements in place with employees. 243  General
guidelines in a policy manual prohibiting the personal use of employer
information would also be wise. 2 4 4 A company will want to "spell out
precisely the scope of an employee's permissible authorization to the
company computers, particularly what they are not permitted to do,
e.g., access the company computers to retrieve company data for a
competitor."245
IV. CONCLUSION
Computer use in the United States has substantially increased
over the last 25 years and has become pervasive in nearly every facet
of life.2 4 6 Computers have allowed employees to perform their job
functions much more efficiently, but they have also presented new
challenges to employers, making it more difficult for them to
safeguard their business data.247 One challenging situation is when
an employee absconds with proprietary information shortly before
resigning to take a position with a competitor or go into business for
herself. Traditional claims by an employer against this type of
employee misconduct include breach of contract, trade secret
misappropriation, unfair competition, or breach of fiduciary duty. 24 8
Recently, however, employers have become more creative and brought
CFAA claims against disloyal employees, asserting that the insider
accessed her protected computer "without authorization."249 Bringing
these claims under the CFAA is beneficial primarily because it opens a
doorway into federal court and requires a lower burden of proof than
traditional claims.250 This Note confronts the issue of whether an
employee's misappropriation of an employer's information in this
manner violates the CFAA, which turns on whether the employee's
access is "without authorization." In recent years, an employer
confronting the disloyal employee has become the most common type
of CFAA case. 251
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Nick Akerman, Time to Review Corporate Computer Policies, LAW TECHNOLOGY
NEWS (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=
1202441909593.
246. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part I.
249. See, e.g., Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
250. See discussion supra Part II.
251. Kerr, supra note 13, at 1583.
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EMPLOYEE AUTHORIZATION
District and circuit court opinions have split. Interestingly, the
most recent district courts to confront the disloyal employee situation
have construed the statute narrowly, but of the circuit courts that
have addressed the question, all but one have construed
"authorization" broadly. 252 The largely one-sided circuit court opinions
are not representative of the district court opinions discussing this
issue, and in most circuits yet to rule on the question, the district
court decisions favor a narrow view. 2 5 3 Given Congress' reluctance to
provide further clarity and the circuit split created by Brekka, the
Supreme Court may well address this question in the coming years. 254
Following recent district court opinions confronting the disloyal
employee scenario, 255 this Note proposes that the Supreme Court
adopt a narrow interpretation of "authorization," and hold that the
term does not apply to employees who have permission to access an
employer's computer. This interpretation not only comports with the
intuitive meaning of the statute but also helps to define the
boundaries of when courts will apply the CFAA-a largely impossible
task under the broad view. A narrow reading of "authorization" will
ensure employee liability does not hinge on the employee's interests
towards an entity who has authorized his access at a given point in
time and will prevent application of the statute in unforeseen ways.
Courts should not interpret the CFAA to reach misuse of an
employer's computer, at least not until Congress authorizes them to do
SO.
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